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    <title>Medical Device Cybersecurity Regulatory Tracker - Blue Goat Cyber</title>
    <link>https://bluegoatcyber.com/news/regulatory-tracker</link>
    <atom:link href="https://bluegoatcyber.com/feeds/regulatory-tracker.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
    <description>FDA, CISA, AAMI, EU, and supply-chain regulatory changes that affect medical device cybersecurity submissions and postmarket programs - dated, summarized, with action items.</description>
    <language>en-us</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 05 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>[EU Commission] EU Cyber Resilience Act becomes fully applicable</title>
      <link>https://bluegoatcyber.com/news/regulatory-tracker/eu-cra-applies-2027-12-11</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://bluegoatcyber.com/news/regulatory-tracker/eu-cra-applies-2027-12-11</guid>
      <pubDate>Sat, 11 Dec 2027 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <category>EU Commission</category>
      <category>Scheduled</category>
      <category>High impact</category>
      <description><![CDATA[The CRA's core obligations - secure-by-design, SBOM, vulnerability handling, and 24-hour incident reporting - apply to products with digital elements placed on the EU market.

What changed:
- Manufacturers must maintain an SBOM and a coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy for the product's support period.
- Actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents must be reported to ENISA/CSIRTs within 24 hours of awareness.
- Medical devices regulated under MDR/IVDR are largely carved out, but software components shipped separately are not.

Action for manufacturers: Decide per product whether CRA or MDR applies, then build the 24h incident reporting playbook now - the cadence is faster than FDA postmarket and many teams are not staffed for it.]]></description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>[Red Hat] RHEL 7 Extended Life Support ends - legacy device fleets need a memo</title>
      <link>https://bluegoatcyber.com/news/regulatory-tracker/rhel-7-els-end-2026-06</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://bluegoatcyber.com/news/regulatory-tracker/rhel-7-els-end-2026-06</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 30 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <category>Red Hat</category>
      <category>Scheduled</category>
      <category>High impact</category>
      <description><![CDATA[RHEL 7 ELS reaches end of support on 30 June 2026. Devices that still ship or service with RHEL 7 need a compensating-controls memo in their postmarket file.

What changed:
- No further security errata for RHEL 7 after the ELS cut-off.
- FDA postmarket reviewers will expect either a migration plan or a documented compensating-controls justification.

Action for manufacturers: Inventory deployed RHEL 7 devices, set a migration target, and draft the compensating-controls memo now - don't wait for the postmarket update letter.]]></description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>[CISA] CISA adds Linux kernel netfilter use-after-free to KEV (CVE-2026-0511)</title>
      <link>https://bluegoatcyber.com/news/regulatory-tracker/cisa-kev-linux-netfilter-2026-04</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://bluegoatcyber.com/news/regulatory-tracker/cisa-kev-linux-netfilter-2026-04</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 22 Apr 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <category>CISA</category>
      <category>Active</category>
      <category>High impact</category>
      <description><![CDATA[A use-after-free in Linux kernel netfilter (CVE-2026-0511) was added to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, affecting many embedded Linux device platforms.

What changed:
- KEV listing triggers federal remediation timelines and shifts hospital/payer expectations.
- Many embedded medical device platforms ship affected kernel versions.

Action for manufacturers: Query your SBOM for kernel versions, publish a VEX (affected / not_affected / fixed / under_investigation), and stage a patch or compensating controls.]]></description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>[CISA] CISA adds widely embedded BLE pairing bypass to the KEV</title>
      <link>https://bluegoatcyber.com/news/regulatory-tracker/cisa-kev-ble-pairing-bypass-2026-04</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://bluegoatcyber.com/news/regulatory-tracker/cisa-kev-ble-pairing-bypass-2026-04</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 15 Apr 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <category>CISA</category>
      <category>Active</category>
      <category>High impact</category>
      <description><![CDATA[CISA added a BLE pairing bypass affecting an embedded Bluetooth stack used across consumer and medical wearables to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.

What changed:
- KEV listing triggers federal remediation SLAs and shifts FDA postmarket expectations from 'monitor' to 'act.'
- Devices using the affected stack should expect questions in any open Q-sub or postmarket update letter.

Action for manufacturers: Run an SBOM query for the affected component, issue a VEX statement (affected / not_affected / fixed / under_investigation), and document the rationale in your postmarket file.]]></description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>[AAMI] ANSI/AAMI SW96 Amendment 1 draft circulated for member review</title>
      <link>https://bluegoatcyber.com/news/regulatory-tracker/aami-sw96-amendment-1-draft-2026-03</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://bluegoatcyber.com/news/regulatory-tracker/aami-sw96-amendment-1-draft-2026-03</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <category>AAMI</category>
      <category>Draft</category>
      <category>Medium impact</category>
      <description><![CDATA[Draft amendment clarifies threat modeling traceability, security risk evaluation, and the relationship between SW96 and AAMI TIR57.

What changed:
- Tighter language on traceability between threats, hazards, and design controls.
- Clearer split between SW96 (process) and TIR57 (technical method).

Action for manufacturers: Review the draft if you have AAMI access; preview the changes against your current threat-model template so you can re-baseline once the amendment is published.]]></description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>[FDA] FDA postmarket cybersecurity &apos;update letter&apos; cadence increases</title>
      <link>https://bluegoatcyber.com/news/regulatory-tracker/fda-postmarket-2025-update-letter-trend</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://bluegoatcyber.com/news/regulatory-tracker/fda-postmarket-2025-update-letter-trend</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 18 Mar 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <category>FDA</category>
      <category>Active</category>
      <category>Medium impact</category>
      <description><![CDATA[Blue Goat Cyber tracking shows a year-over-year jump in postmarket cybersecurity update letters citing missing CVD URLs, stale SBOMs, and lack of triage SLAs.

What changed:
- More letters are referencing the 2026 premarket guidance for postmarket expectations.
- Top deficiency themes: missing/stale CVD URL, SBOM not refreshed in 12+ months, no documented triage SLA.

Action for manufacturers: Run a one-day postmarket hygiene sprint: publish or update CVD URL on the device label and security.txt, regenerate SBOM+VEX, and put a numeric triage SLA in your SOP.]]></description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>[FDA] FDA finalizes 2026 premarket cybersecurity guidance</title>
      <link>https://bluegoatcyber.com/news/regulatory-tracker/fda-2026-premarket-cybersecurity-guidance-finalized</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://bluegoatcyber.com/news/regulatory-tracker/fda-2026-premarket-cybersecurity-guidance-finalized</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 03 Feb 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <category>FDA</category>
      <category>Active</category>
      <category>High impact</category>
      <description><![CDATA[FDA's 2026 final guidance replaces the 2023 document and sets binding expectations for SBOM, VEX, threat modeling, security testing, postmarket plans, and CVD for every cyber device submission.

What changed:
- SBOM is required at submission with named components, versions, and suppliers (no vague 'TBD' rows).
- VEX or equivalent exploitability status is expected for known vulnerabilities at submission time.
- Threat modeling must be traceable to design controls and to the security risk file (AAMI SW96 / TIR57).
- Postmarket plans must define monitoring sources, triage SLAs, and a published CVD URL.

Action for manufacturers: Update premarket templates to align with the 2026 structure: separate cybersecurity risk file, SBOM+VEX bundle, threat model traceability, and postmarket plan with CVD URL on the device label.]]></description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>[FDA] FDA 2023 premarket cybersecurity guidance superseded</title>
      <link>https://bluegoatcyber.com/news/regulatory-tracker/fda-2023-premarket-guidance-superseded</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://bluegoatcyber.com/news/regulatory-tracker/fda-2023-premarket-guidance-superseded</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 03 Feb 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <category>FDA</category>
      <category>Withdrawn</category>
      <category>Medium impact</category>
      <description><![CDATA[The September 2023 premarket cybersecurity guidance is superseded by the February 3, 2026 final guidance. Citing the 2023 document in new submissions is now a stale reference.

What changed:
- The 2023 guidance is no longer the current expectation.
- Templates that hard-code 2023 section numbers need to be re-baselined.

Action for manufacturers: Search your submission templates and SOPs for '2023' guidance references and update them to the 2026 final guidance.]]></description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>[FDA] FDA Quality Management System Regulation (QMSR) takes effect</title>
      <link>https://bluegoatcyber.com/news/regulatory-tracker/fda-qmsr-effective-2026-02-02</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://bluegoatcyber.com/news/regulatory-tracker/fda-qmsr-effective-2026-02-02</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 02 Feb 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <category>FDA</category>
      <category>Active</category>
      <category>High impact</category>
      <description><![CDATA[The QMSR formally aligns 21 CFR Part 820 with ISO 13485:2016. Cybersecurity design controls, risk management, and supplier controls must now be documented under the harmonized framework.

What changed:
- Part 820 is restructured to reference ISO 13485:2016 directly.
- Cybersecurity activities (threat modeling, SBOM, postmarket surveillance) must trace into the QMS - not live in a parallel binder.
- Supplier controls must cover third-party software components and their VEX cadence.

Action for manufacturers: Map your cybersecurity SOPs, threat models, and SBOM/VEX processes into the QMSR clause structure. Any cyber activity that isn't traceable into design controls or supplier management is a gap.]]></description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>[CycloneDX] CycloneDX 1.6.1 errata clarifies VEX status semantics</title>
      <link>https://bluegoatcyber.com/news/regulatory-tracker/cyclonedx-1-6-1-errata-vex-2026-01</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://bluegoatcyber.com/news/regulatory-tracker/cyclonedx-1-6-1-errata-vex-2026-01</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 08 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <category>CycloneDX</category>
      <category>Active</category>
      <category>Medium impact</category>
      <description><![CDATA[1.6.1 errata clarifies how to express 'not_affected' justifications and how VEX statements should reference SBOM components by bom-ref or PURL.

What changed:
- Justification vocabulary tightened to reduce ambiguous 'not_affected' rows.
- Examples added for medical-device style submissions.

Action for manufacturers: Update your VEX generator to emit explicit justifications and stable bom-refs; FDA reviewers increasingly cite missing justifications as deficiencies.]]></description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>[ISO/IEC] ISO/IEC 27001:2022 transition deadline passes</title>
      <link>https://bluegoatcyber.com/news/regulatory-tracker/iso-iec-27001-2022-transition-2025-10-31</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://bluegoatcyber.com/news/regulatory-tracker/iso-iec-27001-2022-transition-2025-10-31</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 31 Oct 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <category>ISO/IEC</category>
      <category>Active</category>
      <category>Medium impact</category>
      <description><![CDATA[Organizations still certified to ISO/IEC 27001:2013 lost certification on 31 October 2025. Hospitals expect the 2022 control set (including A.8 secure development, A.5.7 threat intelligence) in procurement.

What changed:
- Annex A reorganized into 4 themes with 11 net-new controls (threat intelligence, ICT readiness, secure development, monitoring).
- Certification bodies stopped 2013 audits after the transition date.

Action for manufacturers: If you appear in a hospital procurement with a 2013-era certificate, the buyer will treat it as expired. Renew under 2022 and update your MDS2/security questionnaire references.]]></description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>[CISA] CISA Secure by Design pledge expanded with VEX publication expectation</title>
      <link>https://bluegoatcyber.com/news/regulatory-tracker/cisa-secure-by-design-pledge-vex-2025-10</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://bluegoatcyber.com/news/regulatory-tracker/cisa-secure-by-design-pledge-vex-2025-10</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 21 Oct 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <category>CISA</category>
      <category>Active</category>
      <category>Medium impact</category>
      <description><![CDATA[CISA expanded the Secure by Design pledge so signatories are expected to publish VEX statements alongside SBOMs for shipped products.

What changed:
- VEX publication is now an explicit pledge expectation, not an aspirational item.
- Pledge tracker pages flag signatories that publish SBOM but not VEX.

Action for manufacturers: If you've signed the pledge, stand up a public VEX channel; if you haven't, expect customers to ask why.]]></description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>[MDCG (EU)] MDCG 2019-16 Rev. 2 - cybersecurity expectations for MDR/IVDR submissions</title>
      <link>https://bluegoatcyber.com/news/regulatory-tracker/mdcg-2019-16-rev2-applies</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://bluegoatcyber.com/news/regulatory-tracker/mdcg-2019-16-rev2-applies</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 01 Jul 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <category>MDCG (EU)</category>
      <category>Active</category>
      <category>High impact</category>
      <description><![CDATA[Revised MDCG cybersecurity guidance details security risk management, IT environment assumptions, and basic UDI/postmarket cybersecurity expectations for Notified Body review.

What changed:
- Clarifies the split between safety risk (ISO 14971) and security risk (IEC 81001-5-1).
- Spells out IT environment assumptions manufacturers must document and validate.

Action for manufacturers: Cross-reference your MDR technical documentation against Rev. 2's checklist; many 2023-era submissions still cite Rev. 1.]]></description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>[HHS 405(d)] HHS 405(d) HICP 2025 edition updates medical device practices</title>
      <link>https://bluegoatcyber.com/news/regulatory-tracker/hhs-405d-hicp-2025-edition</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://bluegoatcyber.com/news/regulatory-tracker/hhs-405d-hicp-2025-edition</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 01 Apr 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <category>HHS 405(d)</category>
      <category>Active</category>
      <category>Medium impact</category>
      <description><![CDATA[Health Industry Cybersecurity Practices (HICP) 2025 refresh expands medical device practices and adds AI-specific considerations, raising the bar hospitals use during vendor risk reviews.

What changed:
- Expanded medical device practices section with stronger SBOM and asset inventory expectations.
- New AI/ML practices that map directly to FDA's PCCP and SaMD guidance.

Action for manufacturers: Update vendor risk responses to reference HICP 2025 alignment; many large health systems now require a HICP self-attestation appendix.]]></description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>[FDA] FDA finalizes Predetermined Change Control Plans (PCCP) guidance</title>
      <link>https://bluegoatcyber.com/news/regulatory-tracker/fda-pccp-final-guidance-2024-12</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://bluegoatcyber.com/news/regulatory-tracker/fda-pccp-final-guidance-2024-12</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 04 Dec 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <category>FDA</category>
      <category>Active</category>
      <category>High impact</category>
      <description><![CDATA[Final PCCP guidance lets manufacturers pre-authorize specified modifications to AI/ML-enabled device software functions without a new submission, provided cybersecurity impacts are scoped up front.

What changed:
- PCCP must define the modification protocol, impact assessment, and the cybersecurity assumptions that bound each planned change.
- Any change that breaks the cybersecurity envelope falls outside the PCCP.

Action for manufacturers: Cross-reference PCCPs against your threat model and SBOM/VEX cadence so cybersecurity-impacting changes are explicit (or explicitly out of scope).]]></description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>[NIST] NIST SP 800-216 - federal CVD recommendations finalized</title>
      <link>https://bluegoatcyber.com/news/regulatory-tracker/nist-sp-800-216-cvd-final-2024-05</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://bluegoatcyber.com/news/regulatory-tracker/nist-sp-800-216-cvd-final-2024-05</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 30 May 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <category>NIST</category>
      <category>Active</category>
      <category>Medium impact</category>
      <description><![CDATA[NIST SP 800-216 finalizes recommendations for federal vulnerability disclosure programs. While federal in scope, MedTech CVD programs are increasingly being benchmarked against it.

What changed:
- Defines minimum CVD program elements: intake, triage SLAs, coordination, public advisory cadence.
- Aligns with the FDA's postmarket expectations for a published CVD URL.

Action for manufacturers: Benchmark your CVD policy against SP 800-216; gaps (intake email, triage SLA, advisory template) commonly show up in postmarket update letters.]]></description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>[SPDX (Linux Foundation)] SPDX 3.0 final published - adds AI and dataset profiles</title>
      <link>https://bluegoatcyber.com/news/regulatory-tracker/spdx-3-0-published-2024-04</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://bluegoatcyber.com/news/regulatory-tracker/spdx-3-0-published-2024-04</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 15 Apr 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <category>SPDX (Linux Foundation)</category>
      <category>Active</category>
      <category>Medium impact</category>
      <description><![CDATA[SPDX 3.0 introduces profiles (Software, Security, AI, Dataset) that align directly with SaMD and PCCP cybersecurity expectations.

What changed:
- AI profile lets you describe model components, training data, and security properties in the SBOM.
- Profiles can be mixed-and-matched per document.

Action for manufacturers: If you ship AI/ML SaMD, evaluate SPDX 3.0 AI profile output - reviewers asking about model provenance will accept it well.]]></description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>[NIST] NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 published</title>
      <link>https://bluegoatcyber.com/news/regulatory-tracker/nist-csf-2-0-published-2024-02-26</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://bluegoatcyber.com/news/regulatory-tracker/nist-csf-2-0-published-2024-02-26</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 26 Feb 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <category>NIST</category>
      <category>Active</category>
      <category>Medium impact</category>
      <description><![CDATA[CSF 2.0 adds the Govern function and broadens scope beyond critical infrastructure, becoming the de facto baseline hospitals reference in MDS2 / HSCC procurement questionnaires.

What changed:
- New Govern function covers cybersecurity risk strategy, roles, and supply-chain risk management.
- Updated mappings to NIST SP 800-53, IEC 62443, and SBOM-related publications.

Action for manufacturers: Update MDS2 / procurement narratives so they cite CSF 2.0 control families instead of 1.1; hospitals are now scoring against 2.0.]]></description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>[FDA] FD&amp;C Act Section 524B - cyber device requirements in effect</title>
      <link>https://bluegoatcyber.com/news/regulatory-tracker/fda-section-524b-effective-2023-03-29</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://bluegoatcyber.com/news/regulatory-tracker/fda-section-524b-effective-2023-03-29</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 29 Mar 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <category>FDA</category>
      <category>Active</category>
      <category>High impact</category>
      <description><![CDATA[Section 524B (Omnibus 2023) made cybersecurity submission content mandatory for cyber devices. The FDA has issued Refuse to Accept decisions for non-compliant submissions since October 2023.

What changed:
- Cyber devices must submit a cybersecurity plan, SBOM, and evidence of secure design.
- RTA authority empowers the FDA to reject incomplete cyber-device submissions at intake.

Action for manufacturers: If your device meets the §524B 'cyber device' definition, the cybersecurity package is a gating RTA item - not an optional appendix.]]></description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>[IEC] IEC 81001-5-1 - secure software lifecycle for health software</title>
      <link>https://bluegoatcyber.com/news/regulatory-tracker/iec-81001-5-1-edition-1-active</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://bluegoatcyber.com/news/regulatory-tracker/iec-81001-5-1-edition-1-active</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Dec 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <category>IEC</category>
      <category>Active</category>
      <category>High impact</category>
      <description><![CDATA[IEC 81001-5-1 defines the secure development lifecycle for health software and is the foundational standard for the security risk management activities the FDA and Notified Bodies expect.

What changed:
- Establishes secure development lifecycle phases parallel to IEC 62304.
- Defines security risk management vocabulary used by AAMI SW96 and MDCG 2019-16.

Action for manufacturers: Map your SDLC to 81001-5-1 phases; reviewers increasingly expect the standard to be cited as the basis for your security activities.]]></description>
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