Typical clinical uses
- Clinical chemistry, hematology, and immunoassay analyzers
- Molecular diagnostics and PCR platforms
- Point-of-care IVD devices (POC)
- Companion diagnostics tied to therapeutics
- LIS / LIMS middleware and lab-automation orchestration
Cybersecurity for IVD analyzers, LIS integrations, and lab platforms.
IVD analyzers are connected lab instruments that integrate with LIS, middleware, and increasingly cloud reporting. We secure the LIS interface, instrument OS, and remote service paths against both unauthenticated network attacks and insider misuse.
Connected IVD analyzers and middleware sit between lab samples, LIS systems, and increasingly the cloud. A result-tampering compromise is a direct patient-safety event, and lab protocols (HL7, ASTM) often have no native authentication - the design must compensate at the network and middleware layers.
Cloud connectivity changes the risk class of a previously offline IVD for both FDA and customers - it is not just a back-end change.
Typical clinical uses
Key data flows & integrations
Lab interface parsers are a chronic source of memory-safety and authorization bugs.
Many analyzers run end-of-life OS images - patching, allowlisting, and segmentation must be documented.
Vendor remote support paths must be MFA-protected and session-logged.
Connected IVD analyzers and middleware sit between lab samples, LIS systems, and (increasingly) the cloud - a result-tampering compromise is a direct patient-safety event.
Lab protocols often have no native authentication - your design must compensate at the network and middleware layers.
Service-engineer tooling is a recurring entry point and must be treated as a production interface in the threat model.
Adding cloud connectivity to a previously offline IVD changes its risk class for both FDA and customers.
Cross-border lab networks bring GDPR, HIPAA, and local data-residency obligations into your cloud architecture.
What FDA scrutinizes
Reviewers want explicit modeling of analyzer → LIS → EHR with integrity controls at each hop.
Adding cloud changes the risk profile and the cyber documentation expected.
Counterfeit and tampered consumables are an emerging concern - identity authentication should be in the threat model.
CLIA is operational; FDA cyber expectations apply to the IVD as a regulated device. Both apply in parallel.
We document compensating controls (segmentation, allowlisting, restricted services) in the SPDF and labeling, and we test the resulting attack surface from both authenticated and unauthenticated positions.
We fuzz the parsers, test authentication and authorization on every message type in scope, and verify behavior under malformed and oversized payloads.
Yes - vendor remote support paths get a dedicated review: MFA, jump-host isolation, full session logging, and least-privilege scoping. Often a high-value finding area.
If you ship or recommend middleware as part of the cleared system, it's in scope. We test it the same way as the analyzer - appsec, authentication, integration security.
SBOM monitoring on the analyzer OS and middleware, a CVD program, and a documented patch/update plan that respects clinical-lab uptime constraints.
LIS/HL7 interface testing, instrument firmware review, and SBOM for IVD analyzers and molecular platforms.
"Blue Goat Cyber's depth of expertise was impressive. We had no in-house cybersecurity experience, and their team guided us through every step of the FDA process. The penetration testing and SBOM testing were thorough and gave us complete confidence."
Cybersecurity for IVD analyzers, LIS integrations, and lab platforms.