Blue Goat CyberBlue Goat CyberSMMedical Device Cybersecurity
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    Medical Device Threat Modeling

    FDA-compliant threat modeling for medical device submissions.

    DFD3 data flow diagrams with trust boundaries, STRIDE per element, CIA attack trees, and an eSTAR-ready Threat Table where every row traces to a control, a test, and a patient harm. Security architecture views are a separate deliverable.

    250+ FDA submissions supported. No client has failed to clear due to cybersecurity.

    • AAMI TIR57 / SW96
    • ISO 14971 + IEC 62304
    • Trust boundaries mapped
    • Threat → Control → Test
    • Reviewer-ready
    • Free 30-min call
    • No obligation
    • Expert-led from minute one
    • Fixed-fee quote in 24 hours
    • NDA available on request
    Trusted by leading MedTech manufacturers since 2014 · See client outcomes and awards
    Christian Espinosa, Founder & CEO

    Reviewed by Christian Espinosa, MBA, CISSP · Founder & CEO

    Last reviewed

    Why most threat modeling fails medical devices

    Generic cyber risk workshops miss what FDA reviewers care about. A useful medical device threat model must decompose the system, identify threats across the total product lifecycle, and show how controls protect safety and effectiveness.

    Incomplete coverage

    Missing elements, trust boundaries, entry points, or lifecycle threat sources leave reviewers unable to trace cybersecurity risk to patient safety.

    Architecture diagrams passed off as a threat model

    Security architecture views are a separate eSTAR attachment. Supplying them in place of a threat model - or the reverse - is a named deficiency pattern.

    No traceability to harm

    Threats with no control, no test case, and no link to a patient consequence read as narrative, not evidence.

    Attack surface

    What the threat model contains

    The threat model identifies and classifies what can go wrong. It is the anchor artifact other deliverables consume - it is not the security architecture views, and it is not the cybersecurity risk assessment.

    System decomposition

    • DFD3 notation: external entities, processes, data stores, data flows
    • Trust boundaries drawn as closed shapes, each justified
    • Numbered entry points with an Entry Point Descriptions table
    • Named protocols, versions, and cipher suites

    STRIDE per element

    • Every in-scope element walked through all six threat types
    • Boundary crossings analyzed first
    • Six lifecycle threat sources: supply chain through decommission
    • Foreseeable misuse and abuse scenarios

    CIA attack trees

    • One tree each for confidentiality, integrity, availability
    • Roots stated as real patient-relevant goals
    • AND / OR branching to expose shared choke points
    • Every leaf resolves to a Threat Table row

    The Threat Table

    • Minimum eight columns, eSTAR-ready
    • Initial (pre-control) risk with a named mitigation strategy
    • Test-case IDs that scope penetration testing
    • Threat IDs that join to the cybersecurity risk assessment
    Attack surface

    What a STRIDE / AAMI threat model covers

    Threat models are scoped to the data flows and trust boundaries reviewers expect to see. Every element below is enumerated and each STRIDE category exercised against it before a control is proposed.

    1. 01External actors (clinician, patient, attacker, supply chain)
    2. 02Trust boundaries
    3. 03Data flows in / out of the device
    4. 04Process / component nodes
    5. 05Data stores (on-device + cloud)
    6. 06Update + key-management paths
    7. 07Closed-loop control surfaces

    Layers shown outermost (top) to innermost (bottom). Dashed rows are part of the surrounding system but out of scope for this view.

    How it works

    Our process simplifies FDA clearance

    A clear path from system decomposition to a submission-ready threat model.

    1. 01

      1 · Discovery & scoping

      30-minute call to understand your device, intended use, connectivity, submission path, and current cybersecurity evidence.

    2. 02

      2 · System decomposition

      We build the DFD3 diagram: elements, data flows, trust boundaries as closed shapes, and numbered entry points with named protocols and versions.

    3. 03

      3 · Threat identification workshop

      STRIDE per element plus three CIA attack trees, with clinical, engineering, quality, and regulatory teams aligning on threats, controls, and patient harm.

    4. 04

      4 · Threat Table & handoff

      You receive the eSTAR-ready Threat Table with test-case IDs and Threat IDs that hand residual risk to the cybersecurity risk assessment.

    What's included

    Reviewer-ready deliverables in one engagement

    Every medical device threat modeling engagement ships with the artifacts FDA reviewers expect to see - traceable, complete, and aligned with current guidance.

    • ANSI/AAMI SW96 + ISO 14971 alignment
    • End-to-end medical device system coverage
    • Threat-to-mitigation traceability
    • Justified methodology and assumptions
    Notable incidents

    Public premarket cybersecurity history

    Recalls, CISA ICS-MA advisories, and disclosed research that shape what reviewers ask about - and what this engagement is built to cover.

    • the FDA·2024-2026

      Architecture View and STRIDE gap as recurring deficiency

      CDRH deficiency letters in this period consistently call out threat models that fail to enumerate trust boundaries, miss the update channel as an element, or stop at network and ignore internal buses. The 2026 final guidance is more explicit on each.

    "Blue Goat's knowledge of regulatory requirements versus cybersecurity challenges was highly valuable and readily apparent as we were guided by and worked alongside their team towards the development of a comprehensive and compliant cybersecurity plan for our new medical device. Especially helpful for our company as we are a startup. Their team and competencies nicely filled our resource needs. Thank you Blue Goat!"
    Tim Luddy
    Tim Luddy
    Quality Manager · Retia Medical
    Also in premarket: Full-Service FDA Premarket CybersecurityFDA Deficiency ResponseFDA-Compliant SBOM Services
    MedTech segments

    Medical Device Threat Modeling for these segments

    See how this service applies to your specific MedTech segment.

    NeuroTechnology & Brain-Computer InterfacesCardiovascular DevicesDiabetes & Continuous Glucose MonitoringSurgical RoboticsImaging & AI / SaMDIn-Vitro Diagnostics (IVD)Ophthalmic DevicesDental DevicesOrthopedic & Implantable DevicesWomen's Health DevicesCardiac Rhythm Management (CRM)Respiratory & Ventilation DevicesPatient Monitoring & AnesthesiaDialysis & Renal Replacement TherapyEndoscopy & Minimally-Invasive VisualizationRadiation Oncology & RadiotherapyConnected Drug Delivery & Combination ProductsDigital Pathology & Lab AutomationSurgical Navigation & Image-Guided Surgery
    Threat Modeling library

    Resources on this topic

    Curated reading for teams working on threat modeling - grouped by format so you can jump to what you need.

    Guides

    2

    Long-form reference reading - architecture, frameworks, and end-to-end how-tos.

    Articles

    4

    Shorter posts on the specific gotchas, deficiencies, and reviewer expectations we see most.

    Free tools

    Try the free tool first.

    Pressure-test the work yourself before you scope an engagement. No signup, results are yours to keep.

    All free tools
    FAQ

    Questions medical device teams ask before threat modeling

    Ready to build your threat model?

    Threat models FDA reviewers accept - and engineers will maintain.

    DFD3 data flow diagrams with trust boundaries, STRIDE per element, CIA attack trees, and an eSTAR-ready Threat Table where every row traces to a control, a test, and a patient harm. Security architecture views are a separate deliverable.