FDA-compliant threat modeling for medical device submissions.
DFD3 data flow diagrams with trust boundaries, STRIDE per element, CIA attack trees, and an eSTAR-ready Threat Table where every row traces to a control, a test, and a patient harm. Security architecture views are a separate deliverable.
250+ FDA submissions supported. No client has failed to clear due to cybersecurity.
- AAMI TIR57 / SW96
- ISO 14971 + IEC 62304
- Trust boundaries mapped
- Threat → Control → Test
- Reviewer-ready
- Free 30-min call
- No obligation
- Expert-led from minute one
- Fixed-fee quote in 24 hours
- NDA available on request
Why most threat modeling fails medical devices
Generic cyber risk workshops miss what FDA reviewers care about. A useful medical device threat model must decompose the system, identify threats across the total product lifecycle, and show how controls protect safety and effectiveness.
Incomplete coverage
Missing elements, trust boundaries, entry points, or lifecycle threat sources leave reviewers unable to trace cybersecurity risk to patient safety.
Architecture diagrams passed off as a threat model
Security architecture views are a separate eSTAR attachment. Supplying them in place of a threat model - or the reverse - is a named deficiency pattern.
No traceability to harm
Threats with no control, no test case, and no link to a patient consequence read as narrative, not evidence.
What the threat model contains
The threat model identifies and classifies what can go wrong. It is the anchor artifact other deliverables consume - it is not the security architecture views, and it is not the cybersecurity risk assessment.
System decomposition
- DFD3 notation: external entities, processes, data stores, data flows
- Trust boundaries drawn as closed shapes, each justified
- Numbered entry points with an Entry Point Descriptions table
- Named protocols, versions, and cipher suites
STRIDE per element
- Every in-scope element walked through all six threat types
- Boundary crossings analyzed first
- Six lifecycle threat sources: supply chain through decommission
- Foreseeable misuse and abuse scenarios
CIA attack trees
- One tree each for confidentiality, integrity, availability
- Roots stated as real patient-relevant goals
- AND / OR branching to expose shared choke points
- Every leaf resolves to a Threat Table row
The Threat Table
- Minimum eight columns, eSTAR-ready
- Initial (pre-control) risk with a named mitigation strategy
- Test-case IDs that scope penetration testing
- Threat IDs that join to the cybersecurity risk assessment
What a STRIDE / AAMI threat model covers
Threat models are scoped to the data flows and trust boundaries reviewers expect to see. Every element below is enumerated and each STRIDE category exercised against it before a control is proposed.
- 01External actors (clinician, patient, attacker, supply chain)
- 02Trust boundaries
- 03Data flows in / out of the device
- 04Process / component nodes
- 05Data stores (on-device + cloud)
- 06Update + key-management paths
- 07Closed-loop control surfaces
Layers shown outermost (top) to innermost (bottom). Dashed rows are part of the surrounding system but out of scope for this view.
Our process simplifies FDA clearance
A clear path from system decomposition to a submission-ready threat model.
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01
1 · Discovery & scoping
30-minute call to understand your device, intended use, connectivity, submission path, and current cybersecurity evidence.
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02
2 · System decomposition
We build the DFD3 diagram: elements, data flows, trust boundaries as closed shapes, and numbered entry points with named protocols and versions.
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3 · Threat identification workshop
STRIDE per element plus three CIA attack trees, with clinical, engineering, quality, and regulatory teams aligning on threats, controls, and patient harm.
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04
4 · Threat Table & handoff
You receive the eSTAR-ready Threat Table with test-case IDs and Threat IDs that hand residual risk to the cybersecurity risk assessment.
Reviewer-ready deliverables in one engagement
Every medical device threat modeling engagement ships with the artifacts FDA reviewers expect to see - traceable, complete, and aligned with current guidance.
- ANSI/AAMI SW96 + ISO 14971 alignment
- End-to-end medical device system coverage
- Threat-to-mitigation traceability
- Justified methodology and assumptions
Public premarket cybersecurity history
Recalls, CISA ICS-MA advisories, and disclosed research that shape what reviewers ask about - and what this engagement is built to cover.
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the FDA·2024-2026
Architecture View and STRIDE gap as recurring deficiency
CDRH deficiency letters in this period consistently call out threat models that fail to enumerate trust boundaries, miss the update channel as an element, or stop at network and ignore internal buses. The 2026 final guidance is more explicit on each.
"Blue Goat's knowledge of regulatory requirements versus cybersecurity challenges was highly valuable and readily apparent as we were guided by and worked alongside their team towards the development of a comprehensive and compliant cybersecurity plan for our new medical device. Especially helpful for our company as we are a startup. Their team and competencies nicely filled our resource needs. Thank you Blue Goat!"
Medical Device Threat Modeling for these segments
See how this service applies to your specific MedTech segment.
Resources on this topic
Curated reading for teams working on threat modeling - grouped by format so you can jump to what you need.
Guides
2Long-form reference reading - architecture, frameworks, and end-to-end how-tos.
Articles
4Shorter posts on the specific gotchas, deficiencies, and reviewer expectations we see most.
Try the free tool first.
Pressure-test the work yourself before you scope an engagement. No signup, results are yours to keep.
Questions medical device teams ask before threat modeling
Threat models FDA reviewers accept - and engineers will maintain.
DFD3 data flow diagrams with trust boundaries, STRIDE per element, CIA attack trees, and an eSTAR-ready Threat Table where every row traces to a control, a test, and a patient harm. Security architecture views are a separate deliverable.
