Review risk-based update practices and manufacturer evidence. Architecture choices below are planning examples, not universal FDA requirements. Scores cannot establish compliance, risk acceptance, or submission requirements.
Reviewed by
Christian Espinosa
Founder & CEO, Blue Goat Cyber
Update Integrity & Authenticity
What stops a malicious or corrupted update from reaching the device.
Update images are signed with a manufacturer-controlled key
criticalAsymmetric signature, not just a checksum.
Device verifies signature before applying any update
criticalBootloader / OS verifies before commit.
Signing chain uses a hardware root of trust or equivalent protection
highFor example, an HSM, secure element, TPM, or measured boot.
Signing keys use an HSM or equivalent key protection with documented access controls
highNo keys on engineer laptops.
Update Transport & Distribution
How updates get from your build system to the device.
Update server uses mutual TLS or pinned certificates
highServer authenticates the device and vice versa.
Rollback protection (anti-downgrade) is enforced
highMonotonic version counter checked at boot.
Delta or differential updates use the same signing + verification path
mediumDeltas are a common bypass.
Update Deployment & Safety
How updates get applied without harming patients.
A/B partitions or another recovery method support recovery from failed updates
criticalTest recovery from interrupted, corrupted, and unsuccessful updates.
Update preconditions checked (not in clinical use, battery, network)
highNo updates mid-procedure.
Operator / customer notification and consent workflow exists
mediumPer labeling requirements.
Staged / canary rollout supported
mediumCatch field-only issues before fleet-wide.
Lifecycle & Reporting
Risk-based lifecycle planning practices; individual controls and architectures are not universally prescribed by the FDA.
Documented SLAs for critical / KEV-relevant patch deployment
highAligned to Postmarket Cadence Calculator output.
Per-device update success / failure telemetry collected
highYou can prove fleet status to reviewers.
Audit log of every update (who, what, when, version, signature)
mediumTamper-evident.
Key compromise / revocation playbook exists and has been rehearsed
highIncluding emergency re-signing.
Cyber update support window stated in labeling (with EoS date)
mediumPer §524B and FDA premarket guidance.
What you'll see after you submit
Common misconceptions
Myth: TLS to the update server is enough.
Reality: TLS protects the channel. The FDA expects signature verification of the image itself, plus rollback protection - bytes on the device must be authenticated, not just the transport.
Myth: We don't need A/B partitions because we test thoroughly.
Reality: Field environments differ from labs. A/B partitions are one implementation option. Document recovery and rollback appropriate to the device and clinical risks; the FDA does not universally require dual-bank storage.
Myth: Signing keys can live on the build server.
Reality: Keys on a build server are one CI compromise away from being used to push a malicious update at scale. Consider secure key protection appropriate to the threat model; HSM/KMS and dual-control are examples, not universal FDA-prescribed architectures.
References & further reading
Tracked signals that change what reviewers expect. Items move on as new ones land.
RHEL 7 Extended Life Support phase ends - devices on RHEL 7 need a compensating-controls memo
AI-letter analysis - 62% of FDA cyber deficiencies cite a missing or stale CVD URL
AAMI TIR97:2019 errata published - clarifies postmarket triage SLAs
Draft an optional PCCP for manufacturer review; this questionnaire cannot enforce or authorize one.
Read PCCP BuilderPatch SLAs that go with your update mechanism.
Read Postmarket Cadence CalculatorSupport manufacturer review of remediation urgency using device-specific evidence.
Read Controlled vs Uncontrolled Risk ClassifierRun vulnerability response with the right SLAs in place.
Read Postmarket cybersecurity services