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Key Takeaways
- Draw the model, training data, training pipeline, and model updates as separate components, each with a trust boundary.
- Run STRIDE on every AI component, then check the result against the seven AI threats in the FDA's January 2025 draft AI guidance.
- Tie each threat to a patient hazard in your ISO 14971 file, so severity reflects harm and not only technical impact.
- Every control needs a test with pass criteria, and every test result should trace back to the threat it covers.
- If you plan model updates under a PCCP, the threat model must cover the update path, not only the first release.
To threat model an AI-enabled medical device, treat the model, its training pipeline, and its update path as components with their own trust boundaries. Run STRIDE across each, add the AI-specific threats the FDA's January 2025 draft AI guidance lists, and trace every threat to a hazard, a control, and a test. The worked example below shows this for a fictional AI insulin dosing advisor.
Reviewed October 14, 2026
Most threat models for AI devices draw the model as a single box inside "the app." That hides the parts attackers go after: the data the model learned from, the file that holds its weights, the inputs it reads at run time, and the process that ships new versions. When those parts are missing, reviewers notice, and the questions arrive as deficiencies.
This post shows how to add the AI parts properly. We walk through a fictional device step by step, from components and boundaries to threats, hazards, controls, and tests. The device, its numbers, and its findings are invented for teaching. They are not a client project and not an FDA decision.
Why This Matters
Section 524B of the FD&C Act requires cyber device makers to show a plan and processes for reasonable assurance of cybersecurity. The FDA's February 3, 2026 premarket cybersecurity guidance explains how: threat modeling across the whole system, a security risk assessment, architecture views, and testing that traces back to the model. It applies to all device software, including AI functions.
The FDA's January 2025 draft guidance on AI-enabled device software functions adds AI-specific threats to consider, such as data poisoning, model inversion, and evasion. It is still a draft and not for implementation, so treat it as a signal of reviewer questions rather than a binding rule. If you plan to update the model after clearance, the FDA's final PCCP guidance for AI-enabled devices expects each planned change to come with its own validation and impact assessment, which includes cybersecurity.
Meet the Example Device
DoseWise (fictional) is a companion app for an insulin pump. A model running in the cloud reads glucose readings, meal entries, and pump history, then suggests a bolus dose. The patient confirms the suggestion in the app, and the app sends the command to the pump over Bluetooth Low Energy. The model is retrained every quarter on new, de-identified data from consenting users.
The parts that matter for security:
- Pump with firmware that accepts signed commands.
- Phone app that shows suggestions and relays confirmed commands.
- Inference service in the cloud that hosts the model.
- Model file (weights plus a version manifest).
- Training pipeline: data collection, labeling, training, and validation.
- Training data store with de-identified records.
- Model release process that promotes a validated model to production.
Step 1: Draw Trust Boundaries Around the AI Parts
Draw a boundary wherever data or control crosses from one owner or level of trust to another. For DoseWise, the AI-specific boundaries are:
- Phone app to inference service (patient data goes in, a dose suggestion comes out).
- Data collection to training data store (outside data enters the training set).
- Training pipeline to model registry (a new model file is produced).
- Model registry to inference service (a model goes live).
Each boundary gets authentication, integrity checks, and logging. If you cannot say who is allowed to cross a boundary, that is your first finding.
Step 2: Run STRIDE on Each AI Component
| Component | STRIDE category | Example threat |
|---|---|---|
| Inference service | Tampering | Attacker alters inputs in transit to push a higher dose suggestion |
| Inference service | Information disclosure | Repeated queries reveal whether a person's data was in training |
| Model file | Tampering | Model swapped for a modified version in the registry |
| Training data store | Tampering | Poisoned records inserted to bias suggestions after meals |
| Training pipeline | Elevation of privilege | Pipeline service account can also write to production |
| Model release process | Repudiation | No record of who approved a model for release |
| Phone app | Spoofing | Fake app instance requests suggestions with stolen tokens |
Then check the list against the draft guidance's seven AI threats: data poisoning, model inversion and stealing, model evasion, data leakage, overfitting, model bias, and performance drift. Overfitting, bias, and drift are mostly performance topics, but they matter here because an attacker can exploit or hide behind them. A drift monitor that also flags sudden shifts can catch slow poisoning.
Step 3: Turn Threats Into Hazards and Harms
A security finding only gets the right severity when you know what it does to a patient. For DoseWise:
| Threat | Hazardous situation | Harm | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Input tampering raises suggestion | Patient confirms an oversized bolus | Severe hypoglycemia | Critical |
| Poisoned training data | Suggestions skew high after meals for a group of users | Hypoglycemia across many patients | Critical |
| Model swapped in registry | All users get altered suggestions | Wrong dosing at scale | Critical |
| Membership inference | Disclosure that a person uses insulin | Privacy harm | Serious |
| Service outage | No suggestion available | Patient falls back to manual dosing | Minor |
This is the same CIA-to-harm method in our cybersecurity hazard analysis guide, applied to AI parts.
See also: AI Model Integrity for Medical Devices: Signing and Updates, AI Training Data Security for Medical Devices: FDA Evidence, and FDA PCCP Beyond AI: Cybersecurity & Firmware Uses.
Every threat in the model should trace to a hazard, a control, and a test result. Reviewers follow that chain, and a broken link is a common reason for a deficiency.
Step 4: Choose Controls Outside the Model
The model cannot be trusted to protect itself, so controls sit around it:
- Dose limits in the pump firmware. The pump rejects any bolus above the patient's configured maximum, whatever the model suggests.
- Signed model files. The inference service loads only models signed by the release key, and checks the version against an allowed list.
- Data provenance. Each training record carries its source and ingestion date, so a suspicious batch can be found and removed.
- Separation of duties. The training pipeline cannot deploy. A named person approves each release, and the approval is logged.
- Rate limits and output rounding on the inference API to make membership inference harder.
- Drift and anomaly monitoring on suggestions in production, with a rollback plan.
Step 5: Map Each Control to a Test
| Control | Test | Pass criteria |
|---|---|---|
| Pump dose limit | Send oversized commands through the app and directly over BLE | Pump rejects all commands above the limit |
| Signed model files | Replace the model with an unsigned and a re-signed copy | Service refuses to load both and raises an alert |
| Data provenance | Inject a labeled test batch, then trace and remove it | Batch is found and removed within the documented time |
| Separation of duties | Attempt deploy with the pipeline account | Deploy is denied and logged |
| Rate limits | Run a membership inference attack against the API | Attack success is near chance at the set query budget |
| Input integrity | Alter requests in transit with a proxy | Altered requests are rejected |
These tests sit alongside normal app, API, cloud, and wireless pen testing. Our AI pen testing limits post explains why automated AI scanners alone do not cover them.
Step 6: Cover the Update Path
DoseWise retrains every quarter. If the maker files a PCCP, each planned model change should name the security tests that must pass before release, such as the signing and provenance tests above. A change outside those bounds needs a new submission. Our PCCP cybersecurity example shows how to write those bounds.
How Blue Goat Approaches This
We build the threat model with your engineers, not for them. AI parts go in as separate components with boundaries, and every threat ties to a hazard in your ISO 14971 file. We then test the controls the model depends on: model signing, data provenance, release approvals, API abuse, and the device-side limits that keep a bad suggestion from reaching a patient. Findings get CVSS and patient-harm ratings and trace back to the model. Retests are unlimited until findings close. See our medical device threat modeling and AI/ML Medical Device Security pages, or start a draft with the free Threat Model Starter.
Related reading: What a Medical Device Security Advisor Does After FDA Clearance.
FAQ
Do I need a separate threat model for the AI part?
No. Keep one threat model for the whole system and add the AI parts as components inside it. A separate AI model makes it harder to show how threats move between the app, cloud, and device. Reviewers want to follow one chain from architecture to threat to control to test. Splitting it invites gaps at the seams, which is where many real attacks start.
Is STRIDE enough for AI threats?
STRIDE is a good start because it forces you to think about each component. It does not name AI threats such as poisoning or model inversion directly, so check your list against the seven threats in the FDA's January 2025 draft AI guidance. Many teams map each AI threat to a STRIDE category, for example poisoning as tampering, to keep one consistent method.
How do we score severity for AI threats?
Score exploitability with a method such as CVSS, and score severity from patient harm in your ISO 14971 file. A poisoning attack may be hard to carry out but could harm many patients at once, so its severity stays high. Keep the two scores separate and explain how you combine them, since reviewers check that the method is consistent.
Does the threat model have to cover the training pipeline?
Yes, if the pipeline can change what the device does. Training data, labeling, and the release process all affect model behavior. The February 2026 premarket guidance expects the threat model to cover the whole system, and the draft AI guidance names data poisoning directly. A pipeline that is out of scope is a gap reviewers will likely ask about.
When should we update the threat model?
Update it whenever the model, data sources, architecture, or connections change, and at least once per release. Also update it when a new vulnerability or attack method appears that affects your parts. If your device has a PCCP, review the threat model before each planned model change and record the result in your release file.
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Building an AI-enabled device and unsure your threat model covers the model, data, and updates? Book a free 30-minute discovery call. We'll review your current model and send a fixed-fee proposal. Nothing is billed until you approve it.
About the author

Christian Espinosa, MBA · Founder & CEO, Blue Goat Cyber
U.S. Air Force Academy graduate and veteran with 30+ years in cybersecurity. Founded Alpine Security in 2014 (acquired 2020), then Blue Goat Cyber in 2022. Has supported 275+ medical devices, with no cybersecurity-related rejections to date. Author of three books including The Smartest Person in the Room. Ironman triathlete and mountaineer.
Sources & references
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