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    MedTech Cybersecurity · Since 2022

    How we work

    Medical device cybersecurity risk assessment

    Connect medical device threat modeling to patient-safety risk. Assess exploitability, document the clinical harm pathway, and verify controls before judging residual risk.

    What is a medical device cybersecurity risk assessment?

    We classify threats with STRIDE against a data flow diagram of the device. We assess every finding on the security matrix. Only findings with a supported patient-harm pathway and harm severity from your ISO 14971 hazard analysis receive a patient-safety score. Exploitability, read from the CVSS v4.0 calculator instead of a guessed probability, is shared by both matrices. The security matrix pairs it with security impact. The safety matrix pairs it with manufacturer-provided harm severity. If the pathway or severity is missing, the safety assessment remains incomplete. Residual risk is judged against acceptance criteria you set before scoring. We score and recommend; you decide.

    These matrices and the default acceptance line are Blue Goat conventions, not mandatory FDA or ISO scoring rules. A CVSS base score is not a patient-harm score.

    Medical device threat modeling · Buyer FAQs · FDA cybersecurity FAQ

    Connect the threat model to patient harm

    Record the sequence: finding, entry point, attacker action, affected clinical function, hazardous situation, and patient harm. Link it to a hazard ID in the manufacturer’s ISO 14971 file. Device configuration, intended use, clinical workflow, and existing safeguards all matter.

    • Therapy tampering: an unauthorized command could change a dose or energy setting. Establish how it reaches the actuator and which safeguards remain.
    • Clinical-data tampering: a modified measurement could lead to a wrong treatment decision. Document the decision and the harm pathway.
    • Loss of availability: an outage could interrupt needed monitoring or therapy. Assess downtime, fallback care, and the patient population.
    • PHI disclosure: privacy loss alone does not pass the safety gate. A claim of emotional stress needs a supported harm pathway and manufacturer review, not an assumed severity.

    These are illustrative pathways, not findings from a client device. If there is no supported patient pathway, retain the security assessment and document why no safety score applies. If evidence or severity is missing, leave the safety assessment incomplete.

    Medical device security risk matrix

    Exploitability increases upward. Security impact increases to the right. Assess each finding from documented factors, not its STRIDE category or CVSS base score.

    Security impact →
    Exploitability ↑LowMediumHigh
    HighMediumHighCritical
    MediumLowMediumHigh
    LowLowLowMedium

    Medical device patient-safety risk matrix

    Exploitability increases upward. Manufacturer-assigned harm severity increases to the right. Read the intersection only after both inputs are supported.

    Manufacturer-assigned harm severity →
    Exploitability ↑NegligibleMinorSeriousCriticalCatastrophic
    HighMediumHighHighVery HighVery High
    MediumLowMediumMediumHighHigh
    LowLowLowLowMediumMedium

    By default, residual Low and Medium are controlled; High and Very High are uncontrolled. The manufacturer’s documented acceptance criteria and decision take precedence. A lower score alone does not authorize release.

    The steps

    Calculate security and patient-safety risk.

    Download the client risk-scoring deck (PDF). Fictional examples; manufacturer-owned decisions and methodology limits are included.

    1. 1

      Set the rules before scoring anything

      Your acceptance criteria are fixed in the security risk management plan first. They belong to you, the manufacturer; we document them with you: which combinations of patient harm and exploitability are acceptable, which need more controls, and which are never acceptable. Scores are then judged against rules that already exist, so nobody tunes the criteria to fit the results.

    2. 2

      Draw the device as it will ship

      Starting from intended use, use environment, and the harms the device can cause, we draw a data flow diagram in DFD3 notation: external entities, processes, data stores, data flows, and trust boundaries. Every interface an attacker can reach, including service and debug ports, is numbered as an entry point.

    3. 3

      Classify threats with STRIDE, element by element

      Each element is walked through the STRIDE categories that apply to it (spoofing, tampering, repudiation, information disclosure, denial of service, elevation of privilege), following Table 3 of the MITRE / MDIC Threat Modeling Playbook. STRIDE classifies threats; it does not score them. Each threat becomes one row with an ID, its entry point, and the harm it could lead to.

    4. 4

      Rate exploitability, not probability

      We rate exploitability rather than assign an unsupported attack probability. We record the full CVSS v4.0 vector. The Exploitability field in FIRST's calculator uses attack vector (AV), privileges required (PR), and user interaction (UI) to give High, Medium, or Low. That rating sets the vertical position on both matrices.

    5. 5

      Rate security impact

      CVSS v4.0 rates confidentiality, integrity, and availability for the vulnerable system and for anything the exploit reaches beyond it. We take the highest of those six ratings: High gives High impact, Low gives Medium, and all None gives Low.

    6. 6

      Score every finding on the security matrix

      Exploitability and security impact combine in a matrix, not a formula, into Low, Medium, High, or Critical. This gives a separate security priority even when no patient-harm pathway exists. Document proposed controls, remediation priorities, and any manufacturer acceptance rationale. A security rating is not a release decision or an FDA remediation deadline.

    7. 7

      Ask whether a finding can reach a patient

      Trace exploitation to a clinical consequence: changed therapy or energy, altered clinical data, loss of a needed clinical function, or a suppressed alarm. PHI disclosure alone does not establish patient-safety risk. An unclear pathway needs manufacturer and clinical review; keep it open rather than assigning an unsupported safety score.

    8. 8

      Score patient-affecting findings on the safety matrix

      Exploitability combines with severity of harm from your own ISO 14971 hazard analysis (negligible to catastrophic) into Low, Medium, High, or Very High. We don't estimate severity ourselves. For residual safety risk, our default line treats Low and Medium as controlled and High and Very High as uncontrolled. The manufacturer sets the acceptance criteria before scoring and owns the decision. Initial risk is not an acceptance decision.

    9. 9

      Add controls, prove they work, and re-score

      Link each proposed control to the finding and evidence that it works. Penetration testing checks security controls; the manufacturer owns clinical and safety verification. Re-score only when the evidence supports changed factors. Apply acceptance criteria to residual patient-safety risk. Labeling alone does not prove a risk is controlled. We recommend; you decide.

    10. 10

      Re-score when things change

      New vulnerabilities, a CISA KEV listing, design changes, field findings, severity changes, or a failed control trigger a re-score against the same threat ID. A KEV listing doesn't change the exploitability rating on its own; we confirm the device is affected, mark the exploit as known, and re-score if it defeats a control. We recommend remediation over acceptance.

    A short example

    Suppose a fictional infusion pump finding has a demonstrated path to unauthorized dosing. For this illustration only, assume the manufacturer’s hazard file assigns Catastrophic severity and the documented CVSS v4.0 factors yield High exploitability. The matrix gives Very High. If verified changes support Medium exploitability, the result is still High. If evidence supports Low exploitability, the result is Medium. Adding TLS or a pairing step does not automatically establish either reduction. Reassess the actual attack path, vector, safeguards, and clinical evidence before changing the score or accepting residual risk.

    What to keep with each finding

    • Finding ID, affected release and configuration, threat ID, entry point, and attack evidence.
    • Full CVSS v4.0 vector, exploitability rationale, and separate security-impact assessment.
    • Patient-safety pathway, manufacturer hazard ID, harm severity, and its source.
    • Initial score, named controls, security test evidence, and manufacturer safety evidence.
    • Residual score, acceptance criteria, rationale, manufacturer decision, and review triggers.

    Threat-model data flow diagrams describe entry points and trust boundaries. FDA security architecture views are separately scoped deliverables, not automatically included in a standalone threat-modeling engagement.

    Cybersecurity risk management and ISO 14971

    Security impact and patient harm are separate assessments. Link patient-affecting findings to the manufacturer's hazard analysis without treating every security impact as a patient harm. For the full detail on how the two standards work side by side, read ISO 14971 and AAMI SW96: how they fit together.

    Already have a threat model?

    Our threat model gap assessment checks your existing threat model and cybersecurity hazards against this method and gives you a ranked list of what to fix. No threat model yet? Our threat modeling service builds one. Want to build your own first? Download the free threat model template (Excel). To see how exploitability is rated, try the CVSS v4.0 calculator.

    FAQ

    For scope and buying questions, visit our buyer FAQs. For regulatory questions, read the FDA cybersecurity FAQ.

    What standards does this method follow?
    The method draws on ISO 14971 for manufacturer-owned safety risk management, AAMI SW96 and AAMI TIR57 for security risk management, and the FDA's February 3, 2026 premarket cybersecurity guidance. Section 524B sets statutory duties for applicable cyber devices; it does not prescribe these matrices. Our matrix shapes, mappings, and default acceptance line are Blue Goat conventions, not universal FDA or ISO requirements.
    Why not use probability like a safety risk analysis?
    An attacker's actions are not a random component failure. Reliable attack-probability data may be unavailable. We use documented exploitability factors rather than invent a probability. This does not replace the manufacturer's ISO 14971 safety analysis.
    Do you score every hazard in our file?
    No. We focus on cybersecurity-related hazards, where a deliberate attacker could cause harm. Mechanical, electrical, biocompatibility, and use-error hazards stay with your safety team.
    Do you use CVSS?
    Yes, CVSS v4.0, in a specific way. The exploitability rating is read from the Exploitability field of FIRST's CVSS v4.0 calculator, and the security impact rating comes from its six impact metrics. We record the full base score and vector for every finding, but the base score isn't used in the matrices because it also folds in impact. The FDA doesn't require CVSS.
    We already have a threat model. Can you check it against this method?
    Yes. Our threat model gap assessment reviews your existing threat model and cybersecurity hazards and gives you a list of gaps ranked by priority.
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