Connect medical device threat modeling to patient-safety risk. Assess exploitability, document the clinical harm pathway, and verify controls before judging residual risk.
We classify threats with STRIDE against a data flow diagram of the device. We assess every finding on the security matrix. Only findings with a supported patient-harm pathway and harm severity from your ISO 14971 hazard analysis receive a patient-safety score. Exploitability, read from the CVSS v4.0 calculator instead of a guessed probability, is shared by both matrices. The security matrix pairs it with security impact. The safety matrix pairs it with manufacturer-provided harm severity. If the pathway or severity is missing, the safety assessment remains incomplete. Residual risk is judged against acceptance criteria you set before scoring. We score and recommend; you decide.
These matrices and the default acceptance line are Blue Goat conventions, not mandatory FDA or ISO scoring rules. A CVSS base score is not a patient-harm score.
Medical device threat modeling · Buyer FAQs · FDA cybersecurity FAQ
Record the sequence: finding, entry point, attacker action, affected clinical function, hazardous situation, and patient harm. Link it to a hazard ID in the manufacturer’s ISO 14971 file. Device configuration, intended use, clinical workflow, and existing safeguards all matter.
These are illustrative pathways, not findings from a client device. If there is no supported patient pathway, retain the security assessment and document why no safety score applies. If evidence or severity is missing, leave the safety assessment incomplete.
Exploitability increases upward. Security impact increases to the right. Assess each finding from documented factors, not its STRIDE category or CVSS base score.
| Exploitability ↑ | Low | Medium | High |
|---|---|---|---|
| High | Medium | High | Critical |
| Medium | Low | Medium | High |
| Low | Low | Low | Medium |
Exploitability increases upward. Manufacturer-assigned harm severity increases to the right. Read the intersection only after both inputs are supported.
| Exploitability ↑ | Negligible | Minor | Serious | Critical | Catastrophic |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| High | Medium | High | High | Very High | Very High |
| Medium | Low | Medium | Medium | High | High |
| Low | Low | Low | Low | Medium | Medium |
By default, residual Low and Medium are controlled; High and Very High are uncontrolled. The manufacturer’s documented acceptance criteria and decision take precedence. A lower score alone does not authorize release.
Calculate security and patient-safety risk.
Download the client risk-scoring deck (PDF). Fictional examples; manufacturer-owned decisions and methodology limits are included.
Your acceptance criteria are fixed in the security risk management plan first. They belong to you, the manufacturer; we document them with you: which combinations of patient harm and exploitability are acceptable, which need more controls, and which are never acceptable. Scores are then judged against rules that already exist, so nobody tunes the criteria to fit the results.
Starting from intended use, use environment, and the harms the device can cause, we draw a data flow diagram in DFD3 notation: external entities, processes, data stores, data flows, and trust boundaries. Every interface an attacker can reach, including service and debug ports, is numbered as an entry point.
Each element is walked through the STRIDE categories that apply to it (spoofing, tampering, repudiation, information disclosure, denial of service, elevation of privilege), following Table 3 of the MITRE / MDIC Threat Modeling Playbook. STRIDE classifies threats; it does not score them. Each threat becomes one row with an ID, its entry point, and the harm it could lead to.
We rate exploitability rather than assign an unsupported attack probability. We record the full CVSS v4.0 vector. The Exploitability field in FIRST's calculator uses attack vector (AV), privileges required (PR), and user interaction (UI) to give High, Medium, or Low. That rating sets the vertical position on both matrices.
CVSS v4.0 rates confidentiality, integrity, and availability for the vulnerable system and for anything the exploit reaches beyond it. We take the highest of those six ratings: High gives High impact, Low gives Medium, and all None gives Low.
Exploitability and security impact combine in a matrix, not a formula, into Low, Medium, High, or Critical. This gives a separate security priority even when no patient-harm pathway exists. Document proposed controls, remediation priorities, and any manufacturer acceptance rationale. A security rating is not a release decision or an FDA remediation deadline.
Trace exploitation to a clinical consequence: changed therapy or energy, altered clinical data, loss of a needed clinical function, or a suppressed alarm. PHI disclosure alone does not establish patient-safety risk. An unclear pathway needs manufacturer and clinical review; keep it open rather than assigning an unsupported safety score.
Exploitability combines with severity of harm from your own ISO 14971 hazard analysis (negligible to catastrophic) into Low, Medium, High, or Very High. We don't estimate severity ourselves. For residual safety risk, our default line treats Low and Medium as controlled and High and Very High as uncontrolled. The manufacturer sets the acceptance criteria before scoring and owns the decision. Initial risk is not an acceptance decision.
Link each proposed control to the finding and evidence that it works. Penetration testing checks security controls; the manufacturer owns clinical and safety verification. Re-score only when the evidence supports changed factors. Apply acceptance criteria to residual patient-safety risk. Labeling alone does not prove a risk is controlled. We recommend; you decide.
New vulnerabilities, a CISA KEV listing, design changes, field findings, severity changes, or a failed control trigger a re-score against the same threat ID. A KEV listing doesn't change the exploitability rating on its own; we confirm the device is affected, mark the exploit as known, and re-score if it defeats a control. We recommend remediation over acceptance.
Suppose a fictional infusion pump finding has a demonstrated path to unauthorized dosing. For this illustration only, assume the manufacturer’s hazard file assigns Catastrophic severity and the documented CVSS v4.0 factors yield High exploitability. The matrix gives Very High. If verified changes support Medium exploitability, the result is still High. If evidence supports Low exploitability, the result is Medium. Adding TLS or a pairing step does not automatically establish either reduction. Reassess the actual attack path, vector, safeguards, and clinical evidence before changing the score or accepting residual risk.
Threat-model data flow diagrams describe entry points and trust boundaries. FDA security architecture views are separately scoped deliverables, not automatically included in a standalone threat-modeling engagement.
Security impact and patient harm are separate assessments. Link patient-affecting findings to the manufacturer's hazard analysis without treating every security impact as a patient harm. For the full detail on how the two standards work side by side, read ISO 14971 and AAMI SW96: how they fit together.
Our threat model gap assessment checks your existing threat model and cybersecurity hazards against this method and gives you a ranked list of what to fix. No threat model yet? Our threat modeling service builds one. Want to build your own first? Download the free threat model template (Excel). To see how exploitability is rated, try the CVSS v4.0 calculator.
For scope and buying questions, visit our buyer FAQs. For regulatory questions, read the FDA cybersecurity FAQ.
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