BGC Risk Score
Blue Goat Cyber MedTech rubric v1.0 · methodology
3.1 base 7.1 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L
Delay of care
No public exploit observed
5/10 network-reachable signals
How we got to 5.4
- 1
CVSS technical severity (40%)
Industry-standard exploitability + impact score. We prefer CVSS 4.0 and fall back to 3.1 per the FDA's Feb 2026 premarket cybersecurity guidance. Missing CVSS scores get a neutral 4.0 so unknown vulns are not over- or under-rated.
3.1 base 7.1 × 40% = +2.84 - 2
Patient safety impact (35%)
What happens to a patient if this vuln is exploited on a connected device. Auto-inferred from headline, dek, tags, and device class against a curated MedTech keyword library (pacemaker, infusion pump, EHR, PACS, etc.).
Delay of care → 5 × 35% = +1.75 - 3
Exploit maturity (15%)
Is anyone actually using this in attacks? KEV listing > weaponized exploit > public PoC > none. KEV alone forces tier=critical regardless of CVSS.
No public exploit observed → 2 × 15% = +0.30 - 4
MedTech exposure (10%)
How likely this affects clinical operations: presence in our MedTech feed (+4 baseline), network-reachable signals (+3), known device-class tags (+2), identified MedTech vendor (+1).
Exposure 5/10 × 10% = +0.50
Tier cutoffs: Critical ≥ 8.5 · High 7.0–8.4 · Notable 4.0–6.9 · Info < 4.0. Full methodology, weights, and changelog at /goatfeed/risk-rubric.
Vendor match: GE HealthCare
CVSS 3.1: 7.1 (HIGH) - `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L`
BGC-RS: 5.4 (notable) · CVSS 3.1 base 7.1 · patient-safety: delay-of-care · exploit: none · MedTech exposure 5/10 · methodology
Description
Medplum is a developer platform that enables development of healthcare apps. Prior to version 5.1.6, the external identity provider callback at GET /auth/external accepts attacker-controlled redirect URIs that only need to start with a registered client redirect URI, rather than matching exactly. After a successful external IdP login, the server appends Medplum login and code values to that attacker-supplied URL and issues a redirect. Because the external login request state is serialized as raw JSON and later trusted by the callback, an attacker who can tamper with state.redirectUri can cause Medplum to redirect authorization artifacts to an attacker-controlled endpoint. When the registered redirect URI is a bare origin or another prefix that can be extended into a different hostname, this becomes a cross-origin authorization code leak. This issue has been patched in version 5.1.6.