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    CISA KEV: Linux Kernel CVE-2026-53362 (CVSS 3.1 7.8 HIGH) - Kernel Unspecified Vulnerability

    In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: account for fraggap on the paged allocation path In __ip6_append_data(), when the paged-allocation branch is taken (MSG_MORE / NETIF_F_SG / large fraglen), alloclen and pagedlen are computed as alloclen = fragheaderlen + transhdrlen; pagedlen = datalen - transhdrlen; datalen already includes fraggap (datalen = length + fraggap). When fraggap is non-zero, this is not the first skb and transhdrlen is zero. The fraggap bytes carried over from the previous skb are copied just past the fragment headers in the new skb's linear area. The linear area is therefore undersized by fraggap bytes while pagedlen is overstated by the same amount, and the copy writes past skb->end into the trailing skb_shared_info. An unprivileged user can trigger this via a UDPv6 socket using MSG_MORE together with MSG_SPLICE_PAGES. The bad accounting was introduced by commit 773ba4fe9104 ("ipv6: avoid partial copy for zc"). Before commit ce650a166335 ("udp6: Fix __ip6_append_data()'s handling of MSG_SPLICE_PAGES"), the negative copy value caused -EINVAL to be returned. That later commit allowed MSG_SPLICE_PAGES to proceed in this case, making the corruption triggerable. The non-paged branch sets alloclen to fraglen, which already accounts for fraggap because datalen does. Bring the paged branch in line by adding fraggap to alloclen and subtracting it from pagedlen. After this adjustment, copy no longer collapses to -fraggap on the paged path, so remove the stale comment describing that old arithmetic. Since a negative copy is no longer expected for a valid MSG_SPLICE_PAGES case, remove the MSG_SPLICE_PAGES exception from the negative copy check.

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    KEV
    critical

    Blue Goat Risk Score

    Blue Goat Cyber MedTech rubric v1.0 · methodology

    6.9
    of 10
    notable
    CVSS technical
    40% · +3.1

    3.1 base 7.8 · CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

    Patient safety
    35% · +1.8

    Delay of care

    Exploit maturity
    15% · +1.5

    On CISA KEV (in-the-wild)

    MedTech exposure
    10% · +0.5

    5/10 network-reachable signals

    How we got to 6.9

    1. 1
      CVSS technical severity (40%)

      Industry-standard exploitability + impact score. We prefer CVSS 4.0 and fall back to 3.1 per the FDA's Feb 2026 premarket cybersecurity guidance. Missing CVSS scores get a neutral 4.0 so unknown vulns are not over- or under-rated.

      3.1 base 7.8 × 40% = +3.12
    2. 2
      Patient safety impact (35%)

      What happens to a patient if this vuln is exploited on a connected device. Auto-inferred from headline, dek, tags, and device class against a curated MedTech keyword library (pacemaker, infusion pump, EHR, PACS, etc.).

      Delay of care → 5 × 35% = +1.75
    3. 3
      Exploit maturity (15%)

      Is anyone actually using this in attacks? KEV listing > weaponized exploit > public PoC > none. KEV alone forces tier=critical regardless of CVSS.

      On CISA KEV (in-the-wild) → 10 × 15% = +1.50
    4. 4
      MedTech exposure (10%)

      How likely this affects clinical operations: presence in our MedTech feed (+4 baseline), network-reachable signals (+3), known device-class tags (+2), identified MedTech vendor (+1).

      Exposure 5/10 × 10% = +0.50

    Tier cutoffs: Critical ≥ 8.5 · High 7.0–8.4 · Notable 4.0–6.9 · Info < 4.0. Full methodology, weights, and changelog at /goatfeed/risk-rubric.

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